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A PIED-PIPER SITUATION:  
DO BUREAUCRATIC RESEARCHERS PRODUCE MORE SCIENCE? 
 
REMO FERNÁNDEZ CARRO  
Y  VÍCTOR LAPUENTE GINÉ*
 
 
Resumen: ¿Puede un científico confiar en que el gobierno le va a pa-
gar honestamente? En la relación entre la ciencia y el Estado, el go-
bernante sale ganando si no paga (o si no paga honradamente). Todo 
científico público, así, afronta el riesgo de que tras una carrera larga 
y difícil el gobernante cambie las reglas del juego. A pesar de que la 
solución a este problema de credibilidad es lo que da forma a las ins-
tituciones de la ciencia pública el problema ha sido rara vez estudia-
do teórica o empíricamente en los estudios de la ciencia. En este tra-
bajo proponemos un modelo de esa relación entre gobiernos y cientí-
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ficos de acuerdo con la teoría de juegos que muestra la importancia 
del tipo de contrato que los vincula, el que sea más o menos burocrá-
tico en un sentido weberiano. Hasta cierto punto, los contratos buro-
cráticos —como los de los funcionarios— protegen a los científicos 
contra el mal comportamiento de los gobernantes. Mediante esas re-
glas burocráticas, los contratos atan las manos del gobierno con lo 
que se hace creíble su compromiso a la vez que se protege el delicado 
sistema de recompensas de la ciencia. De esta manera se estimula la 
productividad tanto en calidad como en cantidad. Sin embargo, 
cuando se da el caso de gobiernos fiables los contratos burocráticos 
limitan los sistemas de incentivos y van en contra tanto de la recep-
tividad de los científicos a las demandas de los gobiernos o de la so-
ciedad como, al final, al interés de los gobiernos por el producto que 
ofrecen. En este trabajo utilizamos evidencia comparada entre países 
que confirma las proposiciones del modelo teórico y muestra cómo 
los contratos burocráticos estimulan la productividad científica en el 
caso de gobiernos poco confiables —como en el caso de las dictadu-
ras— pero limitan esa productividad con gobiernos más fiables —
como las democracias—. 
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Introduction  
Can a scientist trust the government is going to pay her 
fairly? Fairness is important for a scientist who faces a long-time ef-
fort before her or his work is done, evaluated, and paid. A wrong 
evaluation or misconduct by the payer is a risk she has to consider 
before engaging in a long, difficult career. Usually, the political con-
cern is the opposite: can the politician trust that the scientist would 
not take advantage of the obscurity of her subject to conceal the 
work she is really doing, or its quality. Most of the works in the sub-
ject had focused in this problem. In this paper, nonetheless we ex-
plore the other point of view. We contend that the relationship be-
tween powerful governments and scientists is subject to similar 
problems of credibility as the ones described in the interaction be-
tween, for instance, powerful governments and bankers (North and 
Weingast 1989) or between powerful governments and interest 
groups (Moe 1984, 1990; Horn 1995). The reason is that, once scien-
tists have undertaken costly asset-specific investment in a given re-
search, they are in a weak situation vis-à-vis the government, which 
may take opportunistic advantages such as not rewarding them 
properly.  
When dealing with bankers or with interest groups, as most 
scholars point out, powerful governments, in order to solve their lack 
of credibility, tend to create institutional devices through which they 
tie their hands (Kydland and Prescott 1977): like Ulysses bound to 
the mast, by accepting limitations on its own caprice, one govern-
ment can increase its capacity to achieve its ends (Holmes 1996). 
These limitations often take the form of bureaucratic rules that re-
duce government’s discretion on the control of the administrative 
apparatus (Moe 1990, Horn 1995, Williamson 1999). This kind of 
arrangements can be extended to any problem of trust on the gov-
ernment’s behaviour. Civil service arrangements, which grant public 
employees autonomy from political interference in staff policy, are a 
good example of those bureaucratic rules (Frant 1993). Although 
there is a wide consensus in that institutions matter for policy out-
comes, it is not clear what the particular effects of bureaucratic rules 
over policy outcomes are (North 1999). Some authors highlight how 
bureaucratic rules are efficiency-enhancing (Rauch 1995); some oth-
ers underline how rules are efficiency-decreasing (Moe and Caldwell 
1994).  
In this paper it is argued that, in the case of science, the ef-
fects of bureaucratic rules depend on the regime type. A game-
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theoretic model and its posterior empirical contrast show how bu-
reaucratic rules produce better science in dictatorships, but worse sci-
ence in democracies. In dictatorships it is a solution to the credible 
commitment problem created by autocrats, because benefits of bu-
reaucratisation are higher than its costs (lack of flexibility). In de-
mocracies the problem of credible commitment is much less acute, 
since the rulers are constrained by checks and balances, and bu-
reaucratic arrangements are less useful.  
In science policy studies we lack both theoretical models and 
comparative empirical evidence to contrast the different impact of 
bureaucratic rules on scientific productivity. Science and technology 
policy is still an under-theorized field (Sapolski 1975, Guston 1996), 
without clear predictions on which factors lead to more bureaucratic 
rules in the relationship between governments and scientists. We 
intend to answer two general questions in this paper: First, why do 
governments tie their hands in the management of scientists through 
bureaucratic rules? Second, which are the effects of those bureau-
cratic rules over scientific productivity? 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains why 
principal-agent theory offers an appropriate framework to model the 
relationship between governments and scientists. In section 3 we fo-
cus on the aspect of principal-agent relations — the problem of time 
inconsistency — that we consider key for explaining differences in 
the institutional devices that link a government and its scientists. 
Section 4 develops a game-theoretic model based on time-
inconsistency problems. The model endogeneizes government’s deci-
sion over the type of contract (more or less ‘bureaucratised’) with sci-
entists. Besides, it predicts a country’s science production in func-
tion of the regime type and the level of bureaucratisation of con-
tracts. Section 5 and 6 offer evidence of the theoretical hypotheses 
for dictatorships and democracies respectively and Section 7 sum-
marizes the findings. 
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1 Why a Principal-Agent Model?  
In popular accounts of science, scientists are often portrayed 
as selfless individuals, working for humanity’s sake. Earlier socio-
logical explanations argue that extrinsic rewards, such as position 
and money, play a minor role in science (Hagstrom 1965: 19). In this 
paper, nonetheless, we assume that scientists are interested:1 for 
simplicity, we assume position, money, and direct rewards as in-
strumental goods even for selfless actors. This position allows us to 
treat scientists as agents of the government (here the principal) in a 
principal-agent model. This paper relies on principal-agent explana-
tions, and takes a contractual approach toward explaining public 
science organizations and hierarchies. This contractualist perspective 
fits concerns of science policy and science policy studies with the so-
called “social contract of science”, the tacit promise of science “to de-
liver goods to society in return for its patronage with no string at-
tached” (Rip 1990, cited in Guston 1996).  
A growing strand of literature in science policy has adopted 
this approach, (see for instance Braun 1993, Guston 1996, Caswill 
1998, Van der Meulen 1998, and Morris 2003) in the same standard 
way: a government requests the scientists to perform certain tasks 
the principal is not able to perform directly (Guston 1996: 230). The 
main question we try to answer is “How do non-scientists get scien-
tists to do what we all, as citizens, have decided?” (Guston 1996: 
229) and the key aspect is information asymmetries between the two 
main actors. However, we depart from this literature in three differ-
ent ways. First, we focus on the simplest model -with the government 
as the principal and the scientists as the agents-, ignoring interme-
diate actors.2 In doing so, we are making a rough simplification, but 
our aim is analysing the interplay between the two essential actors in 
science: those who ultimately say what must be done and those who 
ultimately do it. Secondly, we use a one-shot game without repeti-
tion.3  
                                                 
1 We follow the criticism about those assumptions made by the Interest Theory literature in sociology of 
science. See, for instance, Mulkay (1991), Barnes and Dolby (1970), or Barnes (1985).  
2 Other studies focus on intermediate agencies, such as research councils (Braun 1993: 139), or focus 
public or private laboratories as agents. We follow Abraham and Prosch (2000) who analyse technicians 
in high-tech companies.  
3 Van der Meulen (1998) suggests that repeated games could help stability of the relationship. But ulti-
mately no clear predictions may be derived from repeated games, as the so-called Folk Theorem states. 
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Thirdly, coherently with the second way, our model focuses 
on the risks of principal’s misbehaviour. We content in this paper 
that this contract suffers a problem of credible commitment on the 
side of the most powerful actor: the government establishes which 
goods scientists must deliver to society.4 The problem addressed by 
principal-agent theory is usually the design of a contractual struc-
ture to limit agent’s misconduct — the well-known issues of moral 
hazard and adverse selection (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985, Moe 
1990). The agent is seen as the main source of problems while the 
problems created by principals — such as the possibility of not re-
warding the agent, for instance — have been overlooked.5 However, 
principals are sources of problems as well, and especially in the pub-
lic sector, where the principal has a political nature. As Moe (1990) 
has emphasized, principal-agent theories assume enforcement of 
contracts by a third party, but problems may arise when one of the 
parts happens to be that third party. In the public sector, govern-
ments are both one contracting part and that third party at the same 
time.  
Governments can either renege their pacts, because they con-
trol the party that enforces contracts (judiciary), or unilaterally 
change the terms of these contracts, by passing new legislation or 
regulations. Principal-agent models applied to politics often overlook 
this ‘public authority’, according to Moe (1990). Governments have 
an extraordinary and, up to a certain extent, unpredictable power: 
governments at time t cannot bind those at time t + 1, and the in-
centives to renege are often substantial (Moe 1990: 220). Once 
agreements are struck, there is no external enforcement mechanism 
to police them when one of the parts is government. Following Moe 
(1990: 213) we will include this ‘neglected side of the story’ in the 
analysis of science and technology policy.  
                                                 
4 In behalf of society, or not.  
5 Some authors has stress this problem in microeconomics has stressed this problem (see Laffont and 
Tirole 1990).  
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2 Time-inconsistency problems 
Once upon a time on the banks of a great river lay a town called 
Hamelin. The citizens of Hamelin were honest folk who lived content-
edly in their grey stone houses. The years went by, and the town 
grew very rich. Then, one day, an extraordinary thing happened to 
disturb the peace: a black sea of rats swarmed over the whole town. 
The terrified citizens flocked to plead with the town councillors to free 
them from the plague of rats. But the council had, for a long time, 
been sitting in the Mayor's room, trying to think of a plan.  
Just then, while the citizens milled around outside, a stranger pro-
posed to the city council: “for a thousand florins, I'll rid you of your 
rats!”. “A thousand florins!” exclaimed the Mayor. “We'll give you fifty 
thousand if you succeed!”  Next day, by the time the sun was high in 
the sky, there was not a single rat in the town. There was even 
greater delight at the town hall, until the piper tried to claim his pay-
ment. “Fifty thousand florins?” exclaimed the councillors, “Never...”. 
“A thousand florins at least!” cried the pied piper angrily. But the 
Mayor broke in. “The rats are all dead now and they can never come 
back. So be grateful for fifty florins, or you'll not get even that…”.  
Written by economists (see for instance Kydland and Pres-
cott, 1977) the plot of this traditional tale could have been different: 
the pied piper would have rationally anticipated that, once the town 
were free of rats, it would not be in the interest of the Mayor and 
Council to reward him properly. It would be more rational for the 
Mayor to divert the 50 000 florins to building hospitals or directly to 
their own pockets. Therefore, the pied piper would probably have 
stayed at home and the story ends right at the beginning. Anyhow, 
the Tale of the Pied Piper illustrates nicely the problem of time-
inconsistent preferences that is inherent to politics and it has been 
extensively used to show problems of credibility that arise in the re-
lation between government and citizens (Sala-i-Martin 2005). But, 
ironically, it has not been used to shed light into the relationship be-
tween real-world Mayors and real-world Pied Pipers. In this paper, 
we will use it to highlight the relation between governments and a 
particular group of pipers who work for governments, scientists.  
Time-inconsistency problems affect not only those transac-
tions detailed in a written contract between a principal and an agent, 
but also those ‘relational’ transactions that cannot be established in 
a formal contract, as a stream within organizational economics has 
extensively showed: “Every firm requires its employees to take actions 
that cannot be coerced — quality-improving suggestions, transaction-
cost decreasing cooperation with other employees, customer-pleasing 
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friendliness. These actions, by their very nature, cannot be induced by 
any formal incentive system” (Miller and Falaschetti 2001: 406; see 
also Abraham and Prosch, 2000). For example, in any firm, if ra-
tional workers believe their manager will reward them as she prom-
ised, they will engage in higher levels of effort. Similarly, scientists 
need the confidence that they will be properly rewarded. Our theo-
retical model uses insights from the literature dealing with this prob-
lem — especially from the work of Gary Miller (1992, 2001, 2002) — 
to understand the relationship between governments and scientists.  
Gary Miller’s Managerial Dilemmas (1992) analyses the rela-
tionship between employers and employees in private-sector compa-
nies. Although he explores the case of a “piece-rate” system, the un-
derlying problem of credibility he shows can be extended to any kind 
of relation between a boss and her subordinate where the employer 
has incentives to ex post opportunistic defections — like asset spe-
cific investments, information flows, promotion or wage increase 
promises (Gibbons, 2001: 334). In this paper it is contended that it is 
also a key problem in the government-scientists relationship. In the 
example of the piece-rate contract the employer pays the employee 
an amount based on the number of units, or pieces, the employee 
produces. In principle, this system of incentives is an ideal way of 
solving the principal-agent problem in production, because it aligns 
the self-interest of employers with organizational goals. However, as 
Miller recalls after research on the piece-rate contract, it is not used 
so often as standard principal-agent theory would predict.  
According to Miller, there is an underlying game between the 
employer and the employee, whose essence is the issue of informa-
tion asymmetry. Managers can never be sure about what the em-
ployee’s marginal cost of effort functions are, and employees are sys-
tematically trying to protect that information asymmetry. With a 
price p for each piece produced, if the employee discovers a more ef-
ficient production technique or if she decides to work harder, she 
may start to earn more money than employer expected, and the em-
ployer has incentives to adjust piece rates downward (for example to 
p – x) in response to high salaries. Then, the employee has incen-
tives to a strategic misrepresentation: not to implement new tech-
niques and not to work hard. The result is inefficient: the employer 
fixes a lower piece-rate and the employee makes a lower effort than is 
socially desirable. It is a stable outcome, but it is not efficient, be-
cause there is range of outcomes in which both the employee and the 
employer can be better off.  
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Therefore, Miller considers that the relation between employer 
and employee is similar to the “commitment problem” game devel-
oped by Kreps (1990). In Miller’s adaptation of the commitment prob-
lem game (Figure 1), the employee moves first and has a choice of 
trusting the employer (work hard) or not trusting the employer 
(minimum effort). If the employee trusts the employer, the latter has 
a choice of honouring trust (proper reward) or violating trust (cut 
piece rates to a minimum or lay off excess employees). In this move-
ment, the employer has an incentive to violate trust, because she ob-
tains a benefit from adjusting piece rates downward, and this would 
leave the subordinate worse off than if she failed to trust the em-
ployer. Anticipating this violation of trust, the employee refuses to 
trust the employer, which results in an outcome of minimum effort, a 
Pareto-suboptimal Nash Equilibrium.  
Figure 1.– Commitment Problem  
 
Employer’s outcome ranking A > B > C. Employee’s outcome ranking 
A > B > C  Mistrust (payoffs B and C represents a Pareto-suboptimal 
Nash equilibrium. (Figure adapted from Miller 1992).  
A
C
B
Employee Employer 
Violate Trust
Honour TrustEMPLOYEE
Trust
Mistrust
EMPLOYER
B
A
C
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3 The credible commitment game between government and 
scientists  
Similar to Braun (1993: 139), we assume here that it is not 
economic efficiency what guides the actions of politicians in their re-
lations with scientists. Both authoritarian and democratic rulers are 
driven by what Moe (1990) defines as political efficiency: they are in-
terested in remaining in office. Following Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2003), we understand that survival in office depends on two main 
strategies for both democratic and authoritarian rulers. Providing 
public goods (science, for instance) is the first mechanism, which 
seems obvious for democratic rulers, and, as Olson (1993) showed, it 
is also the case for many dictators who see the development of the 
economy (and therefore the progress of science in the country) as an 
asset that will help them keep office.  
The other mechanism is the provision of private goods to 
some strategic interest groups: from privileges to key voters (a given 
social group, or bureaucrats themselves) in democracies, to money 
transfers to foreign bank accounts in kleptocracies. For the sake of 
simplicity, in the theoretical model developed in this section we as-
sume that rulers are interested in providing the public good called 
science, because they have the political perception that science may 
directly contribute to societal ends (Braun 1993; 142), and, there-
fore, to their survival in office. The model, then, predicts, what 
should politicians do if they were interested in providing such public 
good though, as we will see at the end of this section, sometimes 
providing private goods to some groups may be more important than 
providing science. 
Braun (1993: 139) states that financial incentives to motivate 
scientists are seldom feasible in the political system. Political actors 
are restricted in their ability to use resources in a flexible way be-
cause of tight administrative regulations. However, as the extensive 
literature on administrative procedures has shown,6 tight administra-
tive regulations are not universal: certain policies in certain polities 
are constrained by administrative procedures while in certain others 
politicians enjoy a high discretion. It is a politicians’ decision to es-
tablish tight administrative regulations under certain conditions or, 
on the contrary, to keep a high degree of discretion in managing pub-
                                                 
6 Huber and Shipan (2002) provide a comprehensive summary of this literature in Deliberate Discretion: 
The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy.  
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lic employees (Scholz 1991, Moe and Caldwell 1994). Sometimes rul-
ers prefer to use resources in a flexible way and sometimes they pre-
fer to tie their hands with detailed administrative procedures. For 
that reason, contrary to Braun, who treats them as exogenous fac-
tors, tight administrative regulations are here endogenous to the 
theoretical model. The model will try to answer how rulers choose the 
level of discretion they want to enjoy in their relationships with sci-
entists.7  
Figure 2.– The Positive Control Game  
 
Scientist’s outcome ranking A>B>C. Governments’ outcome ranking A>B>C.  
 
                                                 
7 The game deployed here formalizes in a simple way an argument that appears recurrently, implicit or 
explicitly, within the literature on science policy: scientists should be isolated from politicians, because 
the latter lack credibility and they are prone to make arbitrary decisions. For example, Bush in the classi-
cal Science: the Endless Frontier (1945) claimed that scientists should be as autonomous as possible from 
governmental interventions in order the society to obtain the optimal returns from investments in science. 
For Merton (1973), the scientific ethos requires that politicians be inclined to the autonomy of science. 
See also Van der Meulen (1998).  
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The interaction between government and scientists can be 
modelled by a two-person game such as the one shown in Figure 2. A 
simplification is done here: several government politicians from sev-
eral departments are reduced to a single actor, the Government —
 and, therefore, we are ignoring their internal collective action prob-
lems. Even worse, thousands of scientists are reduced to another 
single actor, the Scientist. All intermediate layers of the hypothetical 
hierarchy, and all the separate institutions that mediate among ac-
tors (research councils, or universities, among others) are outside the 
scope of this analysis. Although a more comprehensive and more re-
alistic approach would require including some of those actors in a 
more complex setting, the game representation used here is a heuris-
tic device to depict the relationship between the two main actors.  
The game is similar to the Miller’s trust game between an em-
ployer and an employee depicted above, but now the government (the 
employer) has the choice of playing the trust game — retaining its 
discretion in the management of scientists — or not playing it and 
tying its hands in the management of scientists through a bureauc-
ratisation process. The concept of bureaucratisation used here follows 
the standard definition of bureaucratic rules used by economists (Ti-
role 1994). Bureaucratic rules are limits to the discretion govern-
ments have in their relationships with scientists: government enact 
bureaucratic rules that constrain ex ante its power in hiring, firing, 
promoting and fixing incentives to scientists. Governments may tie 
their hands in the management of scientists in two ways. First, bu-
reaucratisation can be done through delegating the staff policy to a 
politically autonomous institution such as the Corps of university 
professors (or other type of scientists) existing in countries like 
France or Spain. Governments are not free to select, promote, fire or 
introduce monetary incentives to those scientists. Secondly, within 
the concept of bureaucratisation, we include the enactment of laws 
and statutes through which governments limit their future actions in 
the relationship with scientists. For example, when governments is-
sue rules that guarantee secure tenure or automatic promotion in 
function of seniority, governments are reducing their discretion in 
personnel management.  
Bureaucratisation gives predictability to actors’ payoffs. The 
assumption behind the model is that, instead of confronting rela-
tively unpredictable rewards and incentives from political govern-
ments, scientists will deal with predictable rules about rewards and 
punishments — rules enforced by relatively autonomous bodies such 
as University councils or Administrative Corps of scientists. Incen-
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tives also exist in bureaucratised institutions but they are low-
powered. For example, because in principle there are more subordi-
nates than superiors within organizations, there are almost always 
several candidates for a promotion in any kind of organization.  
The idea is that in a bureaucratised organization you must 
follow a more step-by-step promotion system, from one level to that 
right above it. In absence of bureaucratic rules, the government 
could promote any scientist to whatever position. In other words, in-
centives are high-powered, and faster promotions are expected. In-
stead of the high-powered (although less credible) incentives from 
governments, with bureaucratisation scientists will have low-
powered incentives (although more credible because they are made 
by non-political peers) which will be clearly issued in statutes and 
regulations. With bureaucratisation, scientists will not obtain the 
maximum payoff (A) because governments will not be able to offer 
them high monetary rewards or fast promotions to the top levels of 
administration as a reward for maximum effort. But, at the same 
time, bureaucratisation also prevents the worst outcome for scien-
tists (C), because there is no option for being betrayed by govern-
ments in case of choosing a maximum effort. As a result, bureaucra-
tisation induces scientists to exert a medium effort, halfway between 
the maximum effort and the minimum effort. Scientists will work 
harder than the minimum effort, because they know that if they 
work they will have some reward (like a slow promotion), but they 
will work less harder than when they expect high-powered rewards 
from government.  
At the same time, governments do not enjoy the benefits of a 
high-powered system of incentives when they decide to bureaucra-
tise, but they also avoid the worst payoff (C). If government could 
credibly promise it is going to honour trust with a fast promotion or 
with a big reward, it would obtain a higher effort than the medium 
effort it can obtain from bureaucratised scientists. However, if that is 
not the case, scientists will exert a lower effort than bureaucratised 
scientists. In general, bureaucratisation prevents best and worst 
outcomes for both players, and it can be seen as a second-best op-
tion that is preferred when the best solution involves too many risks 
for the actors.  
The payoff structure of the game may be illustrated with the 
example of Germany in the 1930s. Before Nazi’s seizure of power, 
there was a high bureaucratisation among scientists. German uni-
versities were state institutions and all faculty members were subject 
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to a bureaucratised career civil service (Beyerchen 1977). And there 
is wide consensus that German government obtained good scientific 
returns as a result. When Nazis came into power, they developed a 
high discretional approach for science challenging many of the bu-
reaucratic rules existing so far in Germany.8  
In terms of the model depicted here, Nazis moved from the 
predictable lower branch of the tree (Bureaucratisation) to the more 
unpredictable higher branch (Discretion). That implies that some-
times Nazis could achieve extraordinary results: scientists loyal to 
the Nazi party, or those who believed they would be properly re-
warded, were ready to exert a ‘maximum effort’ in their research. The 
Nazis’ great scientific and technological achievements in weaponry 
are an example of that.9 However, Nazis were not able to obtain 
maximum effort from the bulk majority of scientists. Apart from the 
fact that many scientists were either purged or forced into exile, most 
of those who remain at their positions opted for a ‘minimum effort’, 
taking advantage of informational asymmetries: in spite of close 
monitoring, Nazis did not know for sure which type of scientific 
breakthrough those scientists could make.  
The story of Curt Herzstark, inventor of first pocket calcula-
tor, exemplifies the unpredictability of Nazi’s closely controlled sci-
ence.10 Thanks to his informational advantages, Curt Herzstark did 
not want to exert a maximum effort to develop a tool that could be 
nationalized by the Nazi regime — with probably no reward, espe-
cially since he was Jew. However, while he was imprisoned in the 
Buchenwald concentration camp an old competitor and colleague 
recognized him among the prisoners and, as he knew Herzstark had 
been previously working in the development of a revolutionarily small 
calculator, he informed the concentration camp commander of it. 
Soon, a Nazi official — using his high discretion — took Herzstark 
aside and proposed him an exchange: “I understand you've been 
working on a new thing, a small calculating machine. I'll give you a tip. 
                                                 
8 Just two months after the Nazi seizure of power, Hitler issued the “Law of the Restoration of Career 
Civil Service” (April 7, 1933) through which Nazi officials took over the reins of scientists’ tenure, pro-
motion and incentives. As a consequence, many political unreliable and non-Aryan scientists, up to a 25 
per cent in some disciplines, like physics, were soon dismissed from their positions (Beyerchen 1977:12-
14, and 43-47). The law affected anyone, not only those directly affected by it, “those of “non-Aryan” 
descent”, because it became discretional the interpretation of the second condition required to remain civil 
servant: “those whose previous political activities did not guarantee that they would at all times unre-
servedly serve the new state”.  
9 See Wintrobe and Breton (1986) for an extensive analysis of the incentives created by Hitler to induce 
loyal collaborators to maximize their efforts. 
10 See The Curious History of the First Pocket Calculator by Cliff Stoll (2004). 
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We will allow you to make and draw everything. If it really functions, 
we will give it to the Führer as a present after we win the war. Then, 
surely, you will be made an Aryan” (Stoll 2004:86). Under those con-
ditions, rational calculation was difficult to Herzstark: “‘My God!’ I 
thought to myself, ‘If I can make this calculator, I can extend my life.’ 
Right there I started to draw the calculator, the way I had imagined it” 
(Ibid.). Nazis had overcome the informational asymmetry problem: 
they knew quite precisely which type of discovery Curt could do. And 
they were ready to induce him through their incentive system.  
Herzstark understood that if he could develop the calculator 
he would enlarge his life at least some months; otherwise, his fate 
would be the same as the rest of the prisoners. Not lighten of his 
workload, he was allowed to spend his spare time working on the 
calculator, later called Curta. He worked much harder than what he 
had worked previously in the camp (‘minimum effort’) or what he 
would have worked under standard bureaucratic incentives (‘medium 
effort’). And he could have produced the highest payoff (A) for the 
Nazi officials if Allies would not have freed the camp before the inven-
tion was completed and, eventually, won the war.11 This example 
shows the benefits and costs for both government and scientist of 
government’s option for a discretionary science.  
Before analysing governments’ decision about bureaucratisa-
tion, we should see the similarities and differences between Miller’s 
trust game described above and this trust game (the decision of the 
scientist of trusting or not trusting the government and the posterior 
government’s decision of honouring or not honouring trust). In doing 
research, the scientist can make a maximum effort (trust) or a mini-
mum effort (mistrust). What does ‘maximum effort’ mean? We are 
referring here to two types of research effort that are potentially sub-
ject to governments’ time-inconsistency problems.  
In the first place, ‘maximum effort’ would be working hard 
and overtime, similar to what Curt Herzstark did. In the second 
place, ‘maximum effort’ would be making asset-specific investments, 
an effort that is intrinsic to science. Once the asset specific invest-
ment has been made, the scientist is in a weaker bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the government, and the latter may abuse that position of 
power. On the contrary, ‘minimum effort’ would mean maintaining a 
                                                 
11 There is no way to know if camp officials would have kept their word or would have chosen violate 
trust, though this is the most likely choice. Herzstark probably anticipated this outcome. Nonetheless, for 
him extra time as insurance pay was more valuable than the alternative “being killed tomorrow”, even if 
the commitment to the incentive payoff was not credible at all.  
16 Documentos de Trabajo “Política y Gestión” 8/2006 
 
Remo Fernández Carro, Víctor Lapuente-Giné 
level of effort enough to avoid being fired. This minimum level of ef-
fort may take very different forms. It may just be fulfilling the mini-
mum criteria of performance subject to government’s monitoring. 
But it may also imply a sabotage of politicians’ interest. That would 
be, for example, the case of Ludwik Fleck, a Polish epidemiologist 
who was forced by the Nazis to make a typhus vaccine for the Ger-
man army. When he and his collaborators discovered that the vac-
cine was assigned to German troops, they managed to make it totally 
impotent by using an innocuous substance, which looked like a vac-
cine and was able to overcome German quality controls.12 Like in 
Miller’s game, if the scientist chooses minimum effort, the result is 
an inefficient outcome: both actors would be better off with the other 
result (maximum effort/honour trust).   
If the scientist makes a maximum effort, the government can 
honour trust, which in this case means rewarding the scientist. And 
this probably happens in many cases. For instance, many scientists 
were properly rewarded by the Nazis. Governments are not reneging 
on the promises — they have given to scientists — all the time. How-
ever, in the cases of maximum effort depicted above, the government 
has an incentive to violate trust, like in Kreps’ or Miller’s games. 
Governments have incentives in t + 1 to violate trust (i.e. diverting 
the 50 000 florins promised to the piper) and often do so. That also 
happens in democratic settings. A close example is that of Mariano 
Barbacid.  
In the yet uncertain Spanish research system the 1996 new 
conservative government recruited Barbacid, co-discoverer of the 
human oncogenes and kind-of a national celebrity, to manage the 
new state-of-the-art Spanish National Cancer Centre (Centro Na-
cional de Investigaciones Oncológicas, CNIO). Hired as a star signing 
in 1998, Barbacid was promised total support from the Government 
and a €20 million budget a year. However, in its third year, the cen-
tre’s budget was unexpectedly threatened with a one-third cutback. 
A journal commented at that time: “The budget (…) is hardly over a 
0.1 % of the National Health System, but it surely represents an irre-
sistible temptation for a manager in distress”.13 Barbacid faced the 
same threaten again in 2001 and in 2002. He then commented to a 
                                                 
12 Consequently, under the label ‘minimum effort’ we sum the shirking and sabotage activities that 
Brehm and Gates (1997) carefully differentiate. For sake of simplicity in the theoretical model, we as-
sume that both activities produce, although at different levels, the worst possible outcome for the politi-
cian — ”C” in the game. 
13 From 19.83 million to 13.82 million Euros that year. See El País, June 20, 2000, on the budget reduc-
tion, and El País, May 28, 1999, on the Government’s initial support and the main facilities budget.  
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journalist: “We have achieved a great deal, but without a long-term 
commitment from the Government, our efforts may be wasted” (…). “I 
am rather disappointed because when I came back [from the USA] I 
thought that the CNIO would change the attitude of the government 
regarding science”.14  
Up to this point the game is identical to the one used by 
Kreps or Miller and showed in Figure 1 (page 10). However, the deci-
siveness — in words of Cox and McCubbins (2000) — or capacity for 
taking a decision that changes the status quo such as reneging on a 
promise like the one given to Barbacid is limited in some political 
settings. This limit to the decisiveness of governments is captured by 
the parameter d (costs for taking decisions) in government’s payoff.  
Those constraints come from the existence of separation of 
powers within a polity. For example, the incumbent or her political 
party may be the only relevant actor, and then she is entirely free to 
violate trust. However, the government can also be only one of the 
several relevant political actors in a polity. In this case, the govern-
ment will need an agreement with those other veto players — using 
the terminology of Tsebelis (1995, 2002) — in order to break a prom-
ise given to the scientist. Veto players are the actors whose agree-
ment is necessary to introduce a change in the status quo of a politi-
cal system. They can be the members of another party in a coalition 
government. If the Spanish conservative party had governed in coali-
tion, it would have been likely that other coalition members had ve-
toed government’s decision to cut Barbacid’s budget. In absence of 
coalition partners, some political regimes have other limits to gov-
ernmental decisiveness that can be put into action.  
For example, in the case of Barbacid, the public opinion acted 
as a veto player that prevented the government to renege on the 
promise given. The scientist resisted the first attempt to curve down 
the CNIO’s budget in 2000 when the story went to the press. He 
managed to use his public visibility and his reputation to change the 
planned cutback. Early in 2001, he granted a two-full-pages inter-
view to the main Spanish newspaper, El País, closer to the social-
democrat opposition party.15 In the interview he underlined the diffi-
culties to do research in Spain and, specially, the troubles he had 
with the government. As a result of the impact of those statements in 
                                                 
14 The ELSO Gazette, 13, February 2003.  
http://www.the-elso-gazette.org/magazines/issue13/features/features3.asp  Retrieved November 2005.  
15 El País, January 7, 2000: “Si no cumplen, regresaría a EE UU” (“If they do not keep their word, I will 
go back to the USA”).  
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the Spanish media, the government was forced to cancel the planned 
cutback.  
Therefore, when there are ‘veto players’ that make govern-
ments less ‘decisive’ (either coalition partners or strong civil societies 
with free press) it is more difficult for the government to suddenly 
shift the budget from a department to another if it implies violating 
trust. In other words, a mayor of Hamelin in a context of multiple 
veto players would have had more problems to move the 50 000 flo-
rins from the ‘department of pipers’ to other departments.  
Very decisive governments [d < (A – B)] have a higher payoff 
for violating trust (A – d) than for honouring trust (B). Dictatorships, 
where in principle there are no players who can veto ruler’s deci-
sions, would fall into this category. On the contrary, in those polities 
where the constraints for decision-making are strong enough 
[d > (A – B)], like well-established democracies, the government will 
prefer honour trust rather than violate it. The existence of a govern-
ment with limited decisiveness [d > (A – B)] can paradoxically solve 
the problem of trust behind the model because scientist’s choice has 
changed in relation to Miller’s Trust Game: now the options are 
choosing minimum effort, which gives the scientist a payoff of B, or 
choosing maximum effort, which gives her the highest payoff A. 
Consequently, the initial choice of the government (about bu-
reaucratising or not) depends on its decisiveness. When the limits to 
the decisiveness are high [d > (A – B)], as the scientist makes the 
maximum effort the government obtains a higher payoff by choosing 
‘Discretion’ over ‘Bureaucratisation’. The payoff for the government in 
case of ‘Discretion’ will be B. On the contrary, in case of ‘Bureaucra-
tisation’, the government obtains (B – x),16 which is always a lower 
payoff. Thus, when there is low decisiveness, the government does 
not need to bureaucratise its scientists. Conversely, when the limits 
for taking decisions are low for the government [d < (A – B), a situa-
tion of high decisiveness or relative concentration of powers], as the 
scientist makes a minimum effort, the government must balance the 
payoff C of ‘Discretion’ against the payoff B – x of ‘Bureaucratization’. 
If the costs x are not high enough [x < (B – C)], the government would 
prefer Bureaucratization.  
                                                 
16 The reason for this payoff is that governments face a cost (–x) for using bureaucratisation: many times 
they have to pay scientists for life, and they lose flexibility to respond to external shocks demanding, for 
example, fast changes in the scientific priorities or in the size and composition of scientific units.  
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To sum up, there is a substitution effect between the separa-
tion of powers and the bureaucratisation of a public administration. 
In order to induce scientists to exert a level of effort above the minimal 
one, governments must either possess a system of separation of pow-
ers or delegating staff policy to autonomous institutions.  
The game have been assuming up to this point that politi-
cians are in a void, so they can freely choose whether to keep discre-
tion or to introduce bureaucratic rules. And we have seen that, in 
absence of bureaucratic rules, their introduction implies costs (–x) 
for the governments: payment to scientists mostly for life, and losing 
flexibility to respond to external shocks demanding for fast changes 
in scientific priorities. To complete the theoretical section, it is going 
to be assumed a different status quo. Imagine for a second that the 
starting point is, instead of an absence of bureaucratic rules, a situa-
tion of high bureaucratisation of scientists. If the elimination of bu-
reaucratic arrangements did not imply costs, the prediction of the 
model would be that very decisive countries (i.e., dictatorships) 
would keep the level of bureaucratisation while less decisive coun-
tries (i.e., democracies) would change towards a more flexible and 
discretionary approach. However, de-bureaucratisation processes in-
volve costs for governments, because they may imply the elimination 
of, for example, secure tenure or other bureaucrats’ privileges, and 
the reduction of the level of autonomy enjoyed by certain administra-
tive Corps. For instance, most civil service reforms in Western Euro-
pean countries aimed at reducing bureaucratic autonomy have been 
opposed by intense public service unions’ mobilisations. 
As a result, there must be contexts where the costs of de-
bureaucratisation are so high that parameter x in the game may 
have a positive sign: it could enter adding to payoff B instead of sub-
tracting And government, facing a choice between a high bureaucra-
tisation (which gives it a payoff of B + x) and recovering some degree 
of discretion (which gives it a payoff of B), will tend to keep the actual 
levels of bureaucratisation. To sum, the following hypotheses may be 
derived from the model developed in this section: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, when governments 
are not very decisive [d > (A – B)] bureaucratisation of 
scientists is not necessary, and if the costs of an even-
tual de-bureaucratisation are not high [if B > (B – X)], 
governments will choose a high level of discretion in 
scientific policy. In this case, the outcome of the game 
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would the most socially efficient: Discretion/ Maxi-
mum Effort/ Honour Trust.  
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, when governments 
are not very decisive [d > (A – B)], bureaucratisation of 
scientists is not necessary, but, if the costs of an even-
tual de-bureaucratisation are high [(B – X) > B], gov-
ernments will keep the high level of bureaucratisation. 
The outcome of the game would be the second-best 
one: Bureaucratisation.  
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, when governments 
are very decisive [d < (A – B)], bureaucratisation of sci-
entists is necessary, and, if bureaucratisation costs 
are not high [x < (B – C)], there will be a bureaucrati-
sation of scientists. The outcome of the game would be 
the second-best one: Bureaucratization.  
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, when governments 
are very decisive [d < (A – B)], bureaucratisation of sci-
entists is necessary, but, if bureaucratisation costs are 
very high (x < B – C), there will not be bureaucratisa-
tion of scientists. The outcome of the game is the 
worst one: Discretion / Minimum Effort.  
Table 1 summarizes the predicted scientific productivity ac-
cording to the four theoretical hypotheses. It shows scientists’ incen-
tives under different combinations of regime type (dictatorship or 
democracy) and type of scientific contract (more or less bureaucra-
tised). In sections 5 and 6, an empirical contrast of these hypotheses 
is provided. Section 5 analyses the different scientific outcomes of 
the two types of dictatorships: those who have bureaucratised its 
scientists and those who have not. The empirical contrast shows 
how, for dictatorships, the more bureaucratisation, the higher the 
scientific productivity of a country. Section 6 studies the differences 
in scientific productivity across democracies. As predicted by the 
theoretical model, the effect of bureaucratisation over scientific pro-
ductivity is the contrary than for dictatorships: the more bureaucra-
tisation, the lower scientific productivity. 
Documentos de Trabajo “Política y Gestión” 8/2006 21 
 
A Pied-Piper Situation: Do Bureaucratic Researchers Produce More Science? 
 
Table 1.– Predicted Scientific Productivity in function of the re-
gime type and the level of bureaucratisation.  
 
 
Low Bureaucratization of 
Scientists  
(politicians enjoy more 
Discretion) 
High Bureaucratization 
of Scientists  
(politicians enjoy less 
Discretion) 
 
More Decisive 
Governments 
(Dictatorships) 
a) Hypothesis 4: Minimum 
Effort. 
Low Scientific Produc-
tivity 
b) Hypothesis 3: Me-
dium Effort. 
Medium Scientific 
Productivity 
 
Less Decisive 
Governments 
(Democracies) 
c) Hypothesis 1: Maxi-
mum effort. 
High Scientific Produc-
tivity 
d) Hypothesis 2: Me-
dium Effort. 
Medium Scientific 
Productivity 
 
    
    
4 Bureaucratization, scientific productivity, and dictator-
ships  
The relationship between regime type and scientific produc-
tivity analysed in this paper is based on a two-step argument. In the 
first step, the ruler decides the type of scientific contract: more or 
less bureaucratisation of scientists. In the second step, the type of 
contract induces scientists to choose their ‘research effort’ and this 
level of effort ultimately affects the scientific productivity of the coun-
try.  
For the case of dictatorships, the first step implies that those 
dictatorships where the costs of bureaucratisation are no very high 
will tend to establish bureaucratised contracts, while in those dicta-
torships where those costs are high enough rulers will tend to keep a 
high degree of discretion. And the second step entails that dictator-
ships with bureaucratised scientific contracts will tend to perform 
better in terms of scientific productivity than dictatorships with high 
discretion. The first step is difficult to contrast from a quantitative 
point of view and in this section we will provide qualitative examples 
of how some dictatorships, facing problems of credibility with scien-
tists, decide to bureaucratise them, while others, facing the same 
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problems of credibility, decide not to do that because the costs are 
too high in relation to the potential benefits. On the contrary, a 
quantitative analysis of the second step is provided and one can ob-
serve how, controlling for the money spent in science, those dictator-
ships with high levels of bureaucratisation have higher scientific 
productivity.  
4.a Why some dictatorships bureaucratise their scientists  
Why do not all dictatorships establish bureaucratised con-
tracts with scientists if they know that bureaucratisation gives them 
a higher scientific productivity? In the theoretical model we have 
used the parameter x to symbolize the costs rulers must pay for bu-
reaucratisation. When those costs x are lower than the difference be-
tween the payoff with bureaucratisation (a scientific productivity type 
‘B’: medium) and the payoff without (a scientific productivity type ‘C’: 
low), then rulers will decide to bureaucratise. Costs x may be as-
sumed to be quite similar across countries, but the difference be-
tween payoffs B and C may vary a lot in function of what political 
economy authors define as the dictator’s strategy for survival in of-
fice (Olson 1993, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).  
As Robert Bates (2000) suggests, the study of Modern Europe 
Absolutism can shed light on some problems that some African 
states are having nowadays. Early Modern Absolutisms contributed 
with active public policies to the economic development of their so-
cieties while kleptocrats do not show much interest in providing pub-
lic goods. For Bates, with few exceptions, African governments are 
less likely to view their economies as a strategic resource to survive 
in office. Contrary to Louis XIV — who needed to develop his econ-
omy if he wanted to raise taxes in order to have an army able to win 
wars abroad and to suffocate rebellions within French borders — 
Mobutu did not need to do so, because he had many natural re-
sources and he was receiving foreign aid from the US and other 
Western countries.  
The survival strategy of Mobutu-type rulers does not depend 
on the efficiency of policies — and thus increasing scientific produc-
tivity is not an asset for their survival in office. The main risk those 
rulers are facing is internal conspiracies within their own rank-and-
files.17 On the other hand, back to at least Modern European Abso-
                                                 
17 As Acemoglu et al.(2004) have identified in Mobutu’s and Trujillo’s regimes, instead of inducing pub-
lic employees to deliver public goods — such as science —, those rulers tried to “divide-and-rule” their 
administrations in order to avoid public employees’ collusion and plots against them. As a result, the level 
of office rotation within Mobutu’s and Trujillo’s administration was extraordinarily high.  
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lutism, there are examples of rulers who considered that their sur-
vival depended critically on the economic (and thus scientific) devel-
opment of their countries. Two of the most known absolutist rulers 
were precisely the creators of two of the first state institutions of em-
ployed and salaried scientists: in 1666, Louis XIV — under the ad-
vice of Colbert — established the French Academy of Sciences and in 
1700 Frederick II of Prussia put in place the Berlin Academy of Sci-
ences (Fisher and Lundgreen 1975:546-549). From the beginning the 
scientists of the French Academy enjoyed a remarkable level of bu-
reaucratisation and, soon afterwards, their Prussian counterparts 
would also achieve an important degree of autonomy from politicians’ 
interferences in science.  
In sum, one could classify dictatorships in those whose rul-
ers’ survival in office mainly depends on the provision of public goods 
like overall economic performance and thus they could be interested 
in increasing scientific productivity; and those where rulers’ survival 
in office mainly depend on the provision of private goods and have no 
interest in scientific outcomes. To illustrate this difference in survival 
strategies, we are going to depict briefly the evolution of science un-
der Franco’s regime (1939-1975) in Spain.  
Francoism can be divided into two periods. During the first 
one (1939-1957), cabinets chose a very discretionary approach to 
science. In the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), 
Franco's rule was based on repression and on the loyalty of the rul-
ing elite’s factions. In the university, loyal scholars replaced those 
dead, purged or exiled professors, nearly half, during the early 
1940s. Although the university traditionally recruited its members 
through a classic career system, the regime implemented in its first 
years the so-called “patriotic examinations” that primarily evaluated 
the loyalty to the Francoism ideological principles. The aim of this 
selection, explicitly expressed in the University Ordering Law (1942), 
was ideological control.18 In an environment of total uncertainty, sci-
entists exerted a minimum effort and the result was a very low scien-
tific productivity (Fernández-Carro 2002).  
                                                 
18 This Law put the university under the National-Catholic ideals and the Falange’s mainly fascist princi-
ples: “Third Article. The University, inspired by the Catholic sense, inherent to the Spanish academic 
tradition, will bring its teaching to the catholic moral and dogma, and to the rules of the current Canon 
Law. Fourth Article. The Spanish University, in harmony with the ideals of the National-Syndicalist State, 
will adjust its teaching and its educational tasks to the Movement programmatic concerns”. From Uni-
versity Ordering Law: Ley de 29 de julio de 1943 sobre Ordenación de la Universidad española, Boletín 
Oficial del Estado 212, July 31st, 1943, pages 7.406 to 7.431. The Movement (Movimiento or Movimiento 
Nacional) dubs the ruling coalition.  
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Government scientific centres were also explicitly controlled. Al-
though Theology was the only addition to the scientific program in 
the new CSIC,19 it exerted the ideological control of the scientists 
along the ideals of National-Catholicism and of a vindicated imperial 
scientific tradition.20CSIC was also intended to help the development 
of a self-sufficient national industry, imitating the Nazi German au-
tarchy model. ‘Unshakeable loyalty’ to the new state principles was a 
requisite to become a CSIC scientist and researchers were not under 
the civil service status.21 Except for those committed with the regime 
from the beginning, the remaining scientists were limited opportuni-
ties to direct research, to compete for senior positions, or to direct a 
laboratory. 22 As a result, again, productivity was extremely low. As 
González Blasco and Jiménez Blanco (1979:100-) remark, after the 
CSIC was established Spain had not a Nobel laureate in science any 
more. Science in early Francoism suffered scientists’ mistrust of gov-
ernment. As far as prizes and positions were not related to perform-
ance, the incentives for the remaining scientists were low and the 
best response was to limit effort to a minimum.  
Nevertheless, Franco’s survival strategy changed during the 
1950s. After the sunken economic situation had produced serious 
riots and demonstrations in several cities in 1951, Franco shifted his 
policy priorities towards the provision of public goods. 23  He ap-
pointed several ministers known as the Technocrats, uncommitted 
with the fascist ideology, who began to reform the Spanish economy 
to a market-oriented model. They began the so-called Desarrollismo 
— a period of fast economic development. The reforms included a 
transformation of the Public Service to make it more professional and 
                                                 
19 The Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Higher Council on Scientific Research, is the 
main research institution in Spain. Created in 1939, it merged some former public and private institutions.  
20 In a speech to the general council of the CSIC, General Franco stated explicitly its mission: “The Span-
ish regime does not hinder or hamper the legitimate scientific freedom but wants and demands that the 
research activity subordinates and adjust itself to the spiritual and material needs of the country (…). 
This is all about our yearning for empire” (CSIC Annual Report, 1946-47). See also Santesmases and 
Muñoz (1993a: 15-16).  
21 The CSIC had not regulations on labour contracts until 1951 (Decrees of July 13th, 1951, and 6th June, 
1958).  
22 Although the disciples of Ramón y Cajal — Nobel laureate in Medicine — had enjoyed a good interna-
tional reputation before the war they were both dismissed (for instance Francisco Tello, director of the 
Laboratory of Biological Research, who was purged) or were relegated and prevented from having senior 
positions in the CSIC (Santesmases, 1998:323).  
23 Given the medium-long term threat that an underdeveloped economy could pose on Franco’s survival 
in office, his Minister Martin Artajo had suggested that “the moment is appropriate for opening a new 
stage” (quoted in Garcia Delgado 2000:142) 
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career oriented.24 Government scientists' career, in the CSIC and in 
other new laboratories, came under the Civil Service Act and it be-
came life-long. In other words, Spanish scientists became bureaucra-
tised and more autonomous from politicians’ interferences and scien-
tists moved from minimum to higher levels of effort. There are not 
reliable bibliometrical accounts of the period, but the SCI database 
records a sharp increase in scientific productivity at the end of the 
dictatorship: 831 publications in Science and Social Sciences in 
1973 and only 9 publications in the period until 1972.  
4.b Quantitative evidence of bureaucratisation and scientific pro-
ductivity in dictatorships  
The historical evolution of Franco’s rule shows how dictators, 
when their survival depends on fostering economic development, 
choose to tie their hands in the management of scientists through 
what has been called here bureaucratisation. If the predictions of the 
model are correct, one should observe a higher scientific productivity 
in those dictatorships that bureaucratised their scientists than in the 
ones that did not so.  
One of the best proxies to the scientific productivity of a 
country is its Science Production — measured as the number of pub-
lications recorded in the Science Citations Index database (SCI).25 
Since the science production depends on the country inhabitants 
and we must divide Science Production by the total population of the 
country.26 There is a great consensus in the literature that the degree 
of economic development of a country is the most important deter-
minant of its scientific productivity (Price 1963; Cole and Phelan 
1999:14). Given that agreement, for Cole and Phelan (1999:15), the 
relevant question that should be answered nowadays is not the de-
gree of impact of GDP over scientific productivity, but why there are 
countries — like Israel — which produce far more science than what 
one should expect according to its wealth, while there are others —
                                                 
24 A new decree on Civil Service was stated that normalized the procedures: Decreto-Ley de 25 de Fe-
brero de 1957 sobre Reorganización de la Administración Central del Estado.  
25 Cole and Phelan (1999) discuss extensively why SCI is the best feasible alternative to use as a proxy to 
a country’s science production. It could also be argued that some of SCI publications do not come from 
state scientists but from private sector scientists to whom, obviously, our theoretical predictions do not 
apply. However, private firms publish very basic science papers — ranging from almost none in develop-
ing countries and only between a 6% and a 9% in developed ones (Hicks 1995). The proportion may 
increase in some areas, mostly those close to application, and related with physics and chemistry, but 
nevertheless it is a small fraction of a country’s total publications. 
26 More accurately, it depends on the number of scientists, but data are scarce and unreliable; following 
Cole and Phelan (1999), we use the total population as a proxy.  
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 like Italy — which produce far less scientific achievements than 
those expected according to its GDP.  
We want to address this question in this section. Besides, 
given the low number of observations in our regressions both for dic-
tatorships and democracies — and, therefore, the reduction in de-
grees of freedom that comes from including many control variables — 
there is an additional reason to introduce country’s degree of devel-
opment within our dependent variable.27 As a result, we define Scien-
tific Productivity of a Country (SPC) as Science Production by the 
Gross Domestic Product of that country.28 In other words, SPC is an 
artificial construct aimed at measuring the capacity of a country to 
produce science independently of its population and wealth. SPC is 
the capacity a country has to produce science controlling for its 
population and level of development. The proposition of our theoreti-
cal model is that this scientific capacity may be affected by changes 
in scientists’ type of contracts.  
As a proxy for the bureaucratisation of scientists in dictator-
ships we use the Weberianess Score developed by Evans and Rauch 
(1999), which is the most comprehensive attempt to build up a quan-
titative index of bureaucratisation for non-OECD countries. The We-
berianess Score and the other indexes of bureaucratisation we use 
for democracies are similar since they are focused on non-political 
recruitment or promotion and long-term career rewards for the pub-
lic servants. Therefore, they are coherent with our model because 
they try to capture the autonomy of civil servants in relation to poli-
ticians. However, we need to emphasize that those indicators are just 
proxies because their authors do not restrict their focus to scientists’ 
bureaucratisation but they study general public service organization. 
We assume that public researchers and academics in public univer-
sities enjoy the same recruitment and incentives systems than their 
colleagues in other sectors of the public administration, but it might 
not be always the case.29 The Weberianess Score — a continuous 
                                                 
27 Nevertheless, the results do not change if we use country’s science production divided by population as 
a dependent variable and the level of economic development as an independent variable. It simply de-
creases the degrees of freedom in our already small-N statistical analysis. For that reason, we prefer to 
control for GDP in our dependent variable. 
28 It is equivalent to dividing Scientific Productivity (by population) by per capita GDP because ‘popula-
tion’ is dividing both in the numerator and in the denominator. Real GDP figure is taken from the Penn 
World Tables (constant 1996 international $).  
29 Public research centres and universities often have personnel policies that differed of those of the public 
administration, for instance. But there are no datasets specifically devoted to science public bureaucra-
cies. Nevertheless, when a Civil Service Act exists within a country, in general, scientists are covered by 
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variable which ranges from 0 to 14 — measures bureaucratic auton-
omy for 35 developing countries around 1993 and, since in this sec-
tion we are interested in dictatorships, we have removed the democ-
racies from the sample.30  
The model 1 in Table 2 shows the effect of Bureaucratisation 
over the scientific productivity of a country. In spite of the relative 
low number of observations (28), Bureaucratisation exerts a positive 
significant impact on the quality of science. Therefore, it seems that 
the type of contract between government and scientists —
 bureaucratised or not — makes a difference in the scientific produc-
tivity of a country (the science production of the country according to 
its population and economic development).  
In the literature on developed countries,31 scientific produc-
tivity has been found to be dependent also on the country’s expendi-
ture in research and development (R&D) and on its stocks in human 
capital — and we use control variables for those factors in our poste-
rior analysis of democracies. However, the unavailability of reliable 
data on dictatorships on those variables prevents controlling for the 
money invested in science and for countries’ human capital. In spite 
of that, the existence of some data on R&D for some countries and 
some years should allow us undertaking control tests — although 
limited — as the ones deployed in models 2 and 3. We take data on 
Expenditure from the World Development Indicators, which collects 
the percentage of the GDP devoted to scientific activities.  
                                                                                                                   
it. Therefore, we consider that the indexes of civil service’ level of bureaucratisation are good proxies to 
scientists’ level of bureaucratisation.  
30 The Score was Evans and Rauch’s original list includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Congo 
Democratic Republic, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, 
India, Israel, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malagasy Republic, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philip-
pines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and 
Uruguay. We have removed those countries that had a score lower than 2.5 as an average of Freedom 
House’s freedom ratings between 1972 and 1992 (Costa Rica, Israel, Greece, Portugal, Dominican Re-
public, and Spain). The lack of information in some of the independent variables limits the final number 
in the analysis to about 25 countries.  
31 See Cole and Phelan (1999) for a review of the main findings.  
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Table 2.– Determinants of Scientific Productivity in Dictatorships  
Model 1 2 3  
Variables     
Constant  
1.935 
(2.540) 
-6.275 
(4.899) 
7.438** 
(2.701) 
 
Bureaucratisation  
(Weberianess Scale) 
0.762** 
(0.330) 
1.593* 
(0.739) 
-0.472 
(0.366) 
 
Expenditure in Science 1990   
1.459 
(4.23)  
 
Expenditure in Science 2000    
7.639*** 
(1.587) 
 
 R2 0.170 0.725 0.675  
 N 28 9 16  
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients; Standard Errors in parenthesis  
*p < 0.10 ,  **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01  (two-tailed)   
     
The dependent variable is Scientific Productivity of Countries (by Real Constant GDP) in 2000 
There are two major problems that question the validity of 
those controls. First, the number of observations in control models 2 
and 3 is very low (9 and 16 respectively) to extract any relevant con-
clusion. Secondly, the independent variables in models 2 and 3 do 
not show a consistent behaviour: while the significant impact of Bu-
reaucratisation makes no-significant the 1990 Expenditure in Sci-
ence in model 2, the effect of the 2000 Expenditure in Science makes 
Bureaucratisation no-significant in model 3. This behaviour points 
out to problems of multicollinearity, confirmed by the high bivariate 
correlations existing between Bureaucratisation and the available 
measures of expenditure (0.7 and 0.8 respectively). We would need 
further observations to control properly the effect of expenditure and 
we would also need further theoretical exploration — which is out of 
the scope of this paper — on the possible causal relationships be-
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tween bureaucratisation and expenditure in science.32 To sum, in 
spite of the data limits, it seems that our independent variable, bu-
reaucratisation, acts according to the theoretical prediction and it 
exerts a positive effect on the scientific productivity of dictatorships.  
5 Bureaucratization, scientific productivity, and democracies  
Similar to dictatorships, there are two steps to be empirically 
contrasted in democracies: first, the decision of governments over 
which type of contract with scientists they should have; and, sec-
ondly, whether democracies with lower bureaucratisation perform 
better in terms of scientific productivity than democracies with high 
bureaucratisation. Again, the first step is difficult to contrast from a 
quantitative point of view and in this section we will provide frag-
ments of evidence of how some democracies that inherit highly bu-
reaucratised scientific contracts decide to de-bureaucratise their sci-
ence system. On the contrary, a quantitative analysis of the second 
step is provided and one can observe how, contrary to what hap-
pened with dictatorships, controlling for the money spent in science 
and a measure of country’s human capital, democracies with lower 
levels of bureaucratisation have higher scientific productivity.  
5.a Why some democracies de-bureaucratise their scientists  
As a result of the theoretical model deployed here, we expect 
that democratic governments do not need bureaucratisation to pre-
vent scientists to undertake a ‘minimum effort’ in research. However, 
if the status quo of a democracy is bureaucratisation,33 democratic 
rulers will have to balance the potential benefits of a de-
bureaucratisation (the difference between a ‘maximum research ef-
fort’ and the ‘medium research effort’ under bureaucratisation) with 
its costs: the potential opposition of some scientists who enjoy secure 
tenure and other privileges of autonomy.  
                                                 
32 Rauch’s (1995) findings may be useful in this sense. He shows how higher levels of bureaucratisation 
— measured this time through the adoption of Civil Service — led to allocation of greater resources of 
US cities’ governments to long-gestation period projects such as infrastructure during the Progressive Era 
(1900-1920). Something similar could be happening in dictatorships, but further research is needed to 
falsify it.  
33 The explanation of the historical roots of the bureaucratisation of scientists in contemporary democra-
cies is out of the scope of analysis of this paper. In some cases it should be traced back centuries ago. 
However, in line with the arguments of credibility deployed here, we have seen that the bureaucratisation 
of scientists in both France and Germany started to take shape in their 18th century authoritarian regimes 
with the enactment of semi-autonomous Academies of Science. In the case of another contemporary 
democracy like Spain, we have also seen that bureaucratised contracts in research centres were developed 
under an authoritarian regime as well. As a result, past periods of authoritarian rule may explain the adop-
tion of a bureaucratised science in many contemporary democracies.   
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In most countries, scientists — like other civil servants — have 
shown strong resistances against any attempt of de-bureaucratising 
them (Peters and Pierre 2001:1-11). There is strong evidence that 
shows how opposition platforms have been created against many at-
tempts of changing the status quo of scientists, university professors 
or other civil servants (Pierre 2001:133). Conversely, in other con-
texts, costs of reducing bureaucracy have tended to decrease for dif-
ferent reasons: for instance, voters could not support an overpro-
tected and less efficient bureaucracy with some power to change de-
cisions from a democratically elected and checked government.  
The United Kingdom de-bureaucratised its science through 
partial or total privatisations of public laboratories.34 Even though 
the profile of protests was low and some scientists welcomed the op-
portunity to compete for better salaries — coherently with our 
model — resistance to change came both from scientists and the civil 
society who feared a loss of independence in public advice.35  
 
5.b Quantitative evidence of bureaucratisation and scientific pro-
ductivity in democracies.  
Now we move to the second step, the impact of bureaucratisa-
tion over scientific productivity in democracies. Table 3 and Table 4 
show the results obtained by two different proxies to bureaucratisa-
tion in democracies: Closed-ness and Bureaucratization. Results are 
similar in both cases. We use the same dependent variable as for dic-
tatorships — the Scientific Productivity of a Country — and we add 
variables to control by expenditure in R&D and the country’s level of 
human capital.  
In Table 3, the proxy to bureaucratisation is the variable 
Closed-ness, which was prepared by Kai-Uwe Schnapp (2000) using 
data from Auer, Demmke and Polet (1996).36 Closed-ness — a con-
tinuous variable that ranges from 1 to 6 — portrays the career sys-
tems of 17 European countries in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and 
its purpose is capturing the degree of autonomy of civil servants in 
relation to politicians. Open civil service systems are those systems 
where politicians enjoy more discretion in managing public employ-
                                                 
34 Boden, Cox, Nedeva and Barker (2004).  
35 In the failed attempt of full privatisation of the Forensic Science Service, the police opposed for this 
reason (Deborah Cox, personal communication).  
36 Schnapp calls it openness. We have called it closed-ness because we have inverted its values to make 
the comparison with the other empirical analysis easier.  
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ees; closed civil service systems are those whose public employees 
are ‘closed’ to politicians’ interferences. A paradigmatic example of 
the latter would be the already mentioned organizational structures 
based on very autonomous administrative corps like those existing in 
France or Spain. Examples of the former would be the Netherlands, 
Sweden or the UK. 
Table 3.– Determinants of Scientific Productivity in Democracies (I) 
Model 1 2 3  
Variables     
Constant  
59.396*** 
(6.144) 
38.622*** 
(11.778) 
34.769* 
(16.827) 
 
Bureaucratisation 
(Closed-ness) 
-5.554*** 
(1.573) 
-3.804** 
(1.679) 
-3.562* 
(1.883) 
 
Expenditure in Science 
2000 
 7.516** (3.748) 
7.487* 
(3.874) 
 
% of Population with 
Tertiary Education  
  0.194 (0.585) 
 
 R2 0.454 0.576 0.579  
 N 17 17 17  
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients; Standard Errors in parenthesis  
*p < 0.10 ,  **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01  (two-tailed)   
     
The dependent variable is Scientific Productivity of Countries in 2000  
The model 1 presents the results without any control variable 
and bureaucratisation exhibits a highly significant effect on scientific 
productivity. As predicted in the theoretical part, this effect is nega-
tive: the more bureaucratisation in democracies, the less scientific 
output. The availability of more reliable data for democracies than for 
dictatorships allows us to introduce more sophisticated controls in 
this case. In models 2 and 3, we include two independent variables 
which, according to the literature and according to the analysis of 
this dataset, show -on their own- a significant and positive effect on 
scientific productivity: Expenditure in Science for the year 2000 
(again from the World Development Indicators) for controlling the 
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quantity of the GDP actually devoted to science, and the Percentage 
of Population with Tertiary Education, which is the available human 
capital variable that correlates most with science production. Con-
trary to what happened in dictatorships, the bivariate correlations 
among the independent variables are relatively low (in all cases < 0.6) 
and do not point out to any serious problem of multicollinearity.  
The inclusion of the Expenditure in Science in model 2 re-
duces the significance of Bureaucratisation, but the latter keeps an 
independent and significant (at 5%) effect on scientific output. Model 
2 can be interpreted in this way: an increment of one point of Closed-
ness, in a range of 1 to 6, decreases in 3.8 the number of scientific 
papers by unit of country’s wealth in 2000, controlling by Expendi-
ture. To complete the picture, model 3 includes a second control 
variable — a proxy of human capital. With the inclusion of the new 
variable, bureaucratisation and expenditure in science present 
slightly lower coefficients to those in model 2 and they have lost 
some significance (falling from 5% to 10%). Nevertheless, both keep 
their significant effect (negative in the case of bureaucratisation and 
positive in the case of expenditure) on the scientific productivity —
 which is especially remarkable given the decrease of degrees of free-
dom in an analysis with only 17 observations.  
One of the important results of model 3 is that the percentage 
of population with tertiary education — which showed a strong sig-
nificant effect on scientific productivity in previous studies on the 
field and which exhibited also here a significant impact when it was 
included as the only independent variable — loses completely its sig-
nificance when expenditure and bureaucratisation are included. Al-
though no definite conclusions may be extracted from small-N analy-
sis like the one in Table 3, it seems that the bureaucratic nature of 
the scientific contract may affect the scientific outputs of a country 
while reducing the effects of other variables that have received more 
attention in the literature.  
These results are more firmly confirmed in the analysis 
shown in Table 4 where the proxy to bureaucratisation is a combina-
tion of two indexes of public administrations’ human resources prac-
tices created by an OECD team (OECD 2004: 17). They capture the 
De-bureaucratisation of public administrations: up to which extent 
OECD countries have substituted new public management practices 
(more flexibility and more discretion for political managers) for tradi-
tional bureaucratic contracts (more rigidity and more predictability 
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in civil servants’ careers).37 We have added the two indexes of de-
bureaucratisation and have reversed the final values in order to have 
a measure of the degree of bureaucratisation of each country —
 instead of de-bureaucratisation — to compare better this table with 
the previous ones.  
Table 4.– Determinants of Scientific Productivity in Democracies (II) 
Model 1 2 3  
Variables     
Constant 
15.228** 
(6.168) 
7.881 
(6.772) 
7.488 
(7.798)  
Bureaucratisation  
(OECD Bureaucratisa-
tion) 
-1.864*** 
(0.501) 
-1.538*** 
(0.497) 
-1.519*** 
(0.537)  
Expenditure in Science 
2000 
 6.217** 
(2.947) 
6.070* 
(3.299)  
% of Population with Ter-
tiary Education 
  0.055 
(0.915)  
 R2 0.339 0.435 0.435  
 N 29 29 29  
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients; Standard Errors in parenthesis  
*p < 0.10 ,  **p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01  (two-tailed)  
     
The dependent variable is Scientific Productivity of Countries in 2000 
Generally speaking, the results in Table 4 are very similar to 
those in Table 3. The major difference is that the proxy to the bu-
reaucratisation of scientists used here remains highly significant —
                                                 
37 The two OECD indexes of public administrations’ human resources practices are individualisation and 
delegation. “Individualisation”, explain the authors, “is measured by the degree to which the management 
rules and practices vary according to the individuals and less according to the group” (OECD 2004: 17) 
and focuses in the way incentives are applied to public servants.  “Delegation” levels are measured by 
where decision making power is located, from the central bodies (normally out of the control of politi-
cians) to line departments and lower administrative levels (where elected politicians enjoy more discre-
tion). We have combined both indexes for sake of simplicity, but it is important to remark that the results 
are almost identical if we use any of them as proxy to bureaucratisation instead of their combination.  
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 at 1% — even when the two control variables are included (model 
3)38. Like in Table 3, the inclusion of the type of contracts (bureauc-
ratisation) between government and scientists diminishes the ex-
planatory power of two variables traditionally associated with scien-
tific productivity. In the first place, bureaucratisation decreases —
 even to a greater extent than in Table 3 — the significance of the 
money spent in science (Expenditure in Science 2000); and, second, 
it completely eliminates the effect of the available human capital 
variable which is more highly correlated with scientific productivity 
(Percentage of Population with Tertiary Education).  
6 Conclusions  
In this paper, the relationship between regime type, admini-
stration type and policy outcomes (in particular, science policy out-
comes)39 has been closely analyzed. The paper complements the work 
of Fernández-Carro (2002), who focuses on the relationship between 
regime type and science policy outcomes. He shows theoretically and 
empirically how democracies provide a better environment for scien-
tific productivity. This paper also complements the one by Lapuente-
Gine (2005), who analyses the relationships between regime type and 
administration type. He develops and tests a game-theoretic explana-
tion — building up from Miller (1992) and Kreps (1990) — on why 
regimes with high decisiveness (like dictatorships), when interested 
in providing public goods, tend to bureaucratise their public admini-
strations.  
This paper brings the three elements together — regime type, 
administration type and policy outcomes — in a game-theoretic ex-
planation that produces falsifiable propositions that are subject af-
terwards to empirical contrast. As Moe (1997) points out, formal 
models applied to understanding bureaucratic structures tend to be 
too complex, and their implications threaten to be so hedged about 
by qualifications and conditions that they are either trivial or difficult 
to interpret or apply. On the contrary, the model presented here is 
simple, with propositions not dependent on complex qualifications 
and conditions. The propositions are easy to interpret and test, as it 
is shown in the empirical section of the paper. Despite being simple, 
they are not trivial, since they contain two up to a certain extent 
counter-intuitive findings: first, when rulers are interested in produc-
                                                 
38 This is also due to the fact that the number of observations has increased from 17 (Table 3) to 29 (Table 
4) 
39 Science policy outcomes allow better cross-country comparisons than other policies thanks to the exis-
tence of international data-sets such as the Science Citations Index database (SCI).  
Documentos de Trabajo “Política y Gestión” 8/2006 35 
 
A Pied-Piper Situation: Do Bureaucratic Researchers Produce More Science? 
ing science, the more powerful a ruler is, the more she or he will tend 
to bureaucratise her or his administration; and, second, bureaucra-
tisation produces an opposite effect on policy outcomes depending on 
the political regime, it increases the efficiency of policies in dictator-
ships and decreases the efficiency in democracies.  
In sum, this paper shows that there are differences in the sci-
entific productivity between dictatorships and democracies. But 
there are also differences within political regimes. This work con-
tends that those differences are due to the effect of an intermediate 
variable, the bureaucratisation of scientific contracts. Through this 
mechanism dictatorships reduce the high uncertainties and time in-
consistencies inherent to the relationship between powerful princi-
pals (governments) and agents that need to make high asset-specific 
investments (scientists). Bureaucratisation is a second-best solution 
to prevent the ‘minimum research effort’ expected in less credible en-
vironments, like dictatorships. But also precludes the ‘maximum re-
search effort’ expected in more credible environments like democra-
cies. In other words, bureaucracy makes science more productive 
when governments are not reliable, but it makes science less produc-
tive when governments are trustworthy.  
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